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ALS SCAN INC. V. REMARQ
COMMUNITIES, INC.:1 NOTICE AND ISPS'
LIABILITY FOR THIRD PARTY
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

I.

NTRODUCTION

As the Internet grows, courts are struggling to apply traditional
copyright law to the digital world. The nature of the Internet
makes copying extremely easy, and often, copyright owners find
their works posted on websites or in newsgroups 2 by unauthorized
users.3 The ease with which copyrighted material is distributed
through the Internet poses many difficulties for all involved
parties. Individuals and entities, in particular Internet Service
Providers4 ("ISPs"), are faced with the uncertainty of knowing
when they may be held liable for copyright infiingement. For
example, an ISP user may upload copyright infringing information
onto the Internet often by storing this information on the ISP's5
computers for access to others who are "surfing" the Internet.
Thus, the copyright owner's material is easily disseminated
through the ISP typically without the ISP's knowledge that any
infringing activity has occurred. If the copyright owners cannot
1ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. Feb. 6, 2001).

2 Steven E.Halpern, New Protectionsfor InternetService Providers: An

Analysis of "The Online CopyrightInfringement Liability Limitation Act", 23
SETON HALL LEGIS. J.359, 361 (1999) ("A newsgroup is an online collection of
open exchanges and discussions on a particular topic." (citing American Civil
Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Penn. 1996))).
3Daniel R. Cahoy, New LegislationRegarding On-Line Service Provider
LiabilityForCopyright Infringement: A Solution In Search Of A Problem?,38
IDEA 335, 336 (1998).
4 Mitchell P. Goldstein, Service ProviderLiabilityfor Acts Committed ByUsers:
What You Don'tKnow Can Hurt You, 18 J.MARSHALL J.COMPUTER & INFO. L.
591, 592 (2000) (Internet service providers "provide direct access to the Internet
and usually have content provided in a central location, often a Web site, that
anyone can access").
5
1d. at 336.
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discover the identity of the infringer, ISPs are often specifically
targeted by copyright owners for liability for infringing materials
posted by these third parties because the individual who posted the
infringing material cannot be located.
Unfortunately, case law does not help the ISPs or copyright
owners because it does not lead in any one clear direction.
Therefore, Congress began to search for a way to clarify how
copyright law interacts with Internet issues. In October 1998,
Congress answered this dilemma with the implementation of the
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act
("OCILLA") 6 as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA"). 7 The DMCA was drafted to help provide guidance for
ISPs faced with copyright infringing material posted by third
parties. 8 The Background of this Note will examine the current
case law and analyze the protections the DMCA has provided
ISPs. The Analysis will examine the various situations courts have
found in which ISPs do not qualify for protection under the
DMCA.
II. BACKGROUND

Copyright law provides authors the "exclusive rights of
reproduction, distribution, display and performance, and the right
to prepare derivative works." 9 Any encroachment on these
exclusive rights is an infringement, unless the alleged infringer can
show that the act was authorized or constituted an affirmative
defense. 10 Certain affirmative defenses, such as fair use, allow a
person to use the copyrighted material for purposes such as
criticism or news reporting without being found liable for
6Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §512 (1998).
7
Id.
8 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West Group 201).
9
Irina Y. Dmitrieva, I Know It When ISee It: Should InternetService Providers
Recognize Copyright Violation When They See It?, 16 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER& IGH TECH. L.J. 233, 235 (May 2000) citing 17 U.S.C. §106
(1994).
10Halpern, supranote 2, at 366.
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copyright infringement 1 Copyright law allows authors to sue
alleged infringers on the theory of direct liability, 12 but the
Copyright Act of 197613 does not clearly state that non-infringers
can be held liable for allowing third parties to infringe.14 Instead,
the theory of secondary liability allows copyright owners to sue
parties who are not direct infringers under the theories of vicarious
and contributory liability. 15 Direct infiingement occurs when the
alleged infringer violates a specific right of a copyright owner such
as reproducing a copyrighted work without the author's
permission. 16 A court can find a defendant guilty of direct
infringement even if the defendant had no knowledge of the
copying.' 7 Vicarious liability is found when an individual or
entity has a direct financial interest from a copyright violation and
has the right and ability to supervise it although that individual or
entity does not directly commit the copyright violation.'" Both
direct and vicarious liability are examples of strict liability that
does not require that the alleged infringer have knowledge of the
infringement. 19 On the other hand, contributory liability does
Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West Group 2001).
Dmitrieva, supranote 9, at 236.

21Copyright

"317 U.S.C.A. §101-803 (West Group 2001).
14 Bruce G. Joseph & Dineen P. Wasylik, CopyrightIssues On the Internet and

the DMCA, PLI Order No. GO-00N5, 653 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE

HANDBOOK SERIES 245, 254 (2001).
"
16 Id. at 254.
Dmitrieva, supra note 12, at 236.
17 Halpern, supranote 10, at 368; See also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(Party not found liable for direct infringement "[w]here the infringing [third
party] is clearly directly liable for the same act, it does not make sense to adopt
a rule that could lead to the liability of countless parties whose role in the
infringement is nothing more than setting up and operating a system that is
necessary for the functioning of the Internet").
18 Marobie-Fl, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire and Equip. Distrib. and Northwest
Nexus, Inc., 983 F.Supp. 1167, 1179 (N.D. IM.1997) (quoting Hard Rock Caf6
Licensing Corp. v. Concession Serv., Inc. 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc. 443 F.2d
1162 (2nd Cir. 1971))).
1159,
19
Dmitrieva, supra note 16, at 235.
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require knowledge of the infringing activity and the defendant
caused, or materially contributed to the
must have induced,
20
infringing activity.

As the Internet developed and copyright issues arose, the courts
began to determine which theory of liability infringers could be
held accountable. The initial case law fell on all ends of the
spectrum, some finding that ISPs may be held directly liable for
infinging material posted by third parties even if they were
unaware of the infiinging material, 2 ' while later courts found that
while an ISP is not directly liable, they may be liable under the
theory of contributory infringement which requires the defendant
have knowledge about the infdnging material.22 The case law at
the time led only to uncertainty of when ISPs would be held
accountable for infringing material posted by third parties until
Congress stepped in and passed the DMCA, to give ISPs guidance
regarding their liability.23 The members of the House and Senate
prepared a conference report on the DMCA stressing the
importance of the new legislation.24 The report states that
"[OCILLA] provides greater certainty to service providers
concerning their legal exposure' 2 5for infringements that may occur
in the course of their activities.

21Marobie-Fl,Inc.,

983 F.Supp. at 1178; See also Religious Tech., 907 F.Supp.
at 1382 ("To state a claim for contributory infringement, plaintiffs must allege
that [defendant] knew or should have known of [the third party's] infringing
actions at the time they occurred and yet substantially participated by
"induc[ing], caus[ing] or materially contribut[ing] to the infringing conduct" of
[the third party]." (quoting Gershwin Publ'g,443 F.2d at 1162)).
21 See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla.
1993) (stating that defendant need not have knowledge of infringement for
finding of direct copyright infringement).
22 Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs.,
Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (1995) (fair to hold defendant liable for
contributory infringement when defendant has knowledge of infringing activity
but continues to aid in the infringing activity such as continuing to post
copyright infringing material on a bulletin board).
at 239.
23
24 Dmitrieva, supra note 19,
H.R.CONF. REP. No. 105-796 (1998).
2
1Id.at 72.
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A. Summary of Title II Provisionsof the DMCA

The OCILLA amended Chapter 5 of the DMCA by adding a
new section titled "Limitations on Liability Relating to Material
Online."2 6 It provides protections for ISPs who "unknowingly
transmit or store copyrighted material" 27 as long as those ISPs
follow the specific actions required in the DMCA.28 In order to
qualify for the DMCA's protections, an ISP must meet the
definition of a "service provider" which is defined by the statute in
two ways. For subsection (a) of OCILLA, a "service provider" is
defined as "an entity offering the transmission, routing, or
providing of connections for digital online communications,
between or among points specified by a user, of material of the
user's choosing, without modification to the content of the
material as sent or received., 29 For all other subsections, a
"service provider" is defined as "a provider of online services or
network access, or the operator of facilities therefor." 30 ISPs must
also employ and notify users of their policy that terminates
31
privileges of any users who repeatedly infringe copyrights.
If the ISP satisfies the service provider definition and
notification requirements, the ISP may qualify for protections such
as affirmative defenses and "safe harbors" against liability for
copyright infingement by third parties. There are four categories
of activity protected by the "safe harbors:" 1) transitory digital
network communications, 2) system caching, 3) information
residing on systems or networks at the direction of users, and 4)
information location tools. 32 ISPs are protected by these "safe
harbors" from monetary relief for direct, vicarious, and
26 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West Group 2001).
27

John F. Delaney & M. Lorrane Ford, The Law of the Internet: A Summary of

U.S.Internet CaseLaw and Legal Developments, PLI Order No. BO-0100, 1244
PRAcTIsING LAW INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK
SERIES 103, 138-139 (2001).
28

Id.at 138-139.
17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (k)(1)(A).
30 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (k)(1)(B).
31Delaney, supra note 27, at 139-142.
32
Dmitrieva,supra note 23, at 239.
29
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contributory33infringement and limited protection is given against
injunctions.
B. TransitoryDigitalNetwork Communications
Subsection (a) of OCILLA limits liability of ISPs who perform
only as a "passive conduit" for actions such as transmitting,
routing, or providing connections for digital network
communications. 34 Some examples of "passive conduit" activity
include email services and newsgroups.3 5 Several conditions are
required for an ISP to qualify for this limitation: the transmission
of the material must be initiated by a third party; the ISP must not
select or modify the content of the transmission; it must not select
the recipients of the material; and it must not maintain a copy of
the message on a system or network in a manner ordinarily
accessible to such anticipated recipients for36a period longer than is
reasonably necessary for the transmissions.
C. System Caching
Subsection (b) of OCILLA limits liability of ISPs for "storage of
material in the process of system caching. 37 System caching is the
temporary storage of Internet material locally on the ISP's server
so that material can be accessed more readily.38 An ISP may enjoy
this limitation if it meets several conditions: the material was
made available online by a third party; the ISP cannot have
modified the material; refreshing or updating of the material was
done in accordance with accepted industry standards; there is no
interference with the ability of the technology to return data to the
content provider; and the ISP shall permit only those who have
permission from the content provider, either through use of a fee
3

Id.at 240.

4Id. at
35 d.

241.

3

6See 17 U.S.C.A. 512(a)(1-5).
7 Dmitrieva, supra note 35, at 241.

3

38

See Delaney, supra note 31, at 139-140.
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or a password, access to the material.3 9

D. InformationResiding on Systems or Networks at Direction of
Users
Subsection (c) and (d) of OCILLA contain conditions that
"combine the elements of contributory and vicarious liability. ' 4°
Subsection (c) limits liability of ISPs for information residing on
systems or networks at the direction of users. 41 An example of this
is a web page. In order to qualify for this "safe harbor" the ISP
must not have actual knowledge about the infringing material,
must not directly benefit financially from such infringing activity,
and upon gaining knowledge of the infringing material, the ISP
must remove or disable access to the material. 42 OCILLA
provides that in order to qualify for the limitations on liability
described in subsection (c), the ISP must designate
an agent to
43
receive notifications of alleged infiingement.
In addition, there are specific elements of notification that the
complaining party must meet in order to satisfy the notification
requirement. 44 These written notices must be provided to the ISP's
designated agent and must contain the following elements: 45 a
physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on
behalf of the copyright owner for the allegedly infringed exclusive
right;46 identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have
been infringed, or if multiple copyrighted works are claimed to be
infringed at a single online site, a representative list of such works
at that site; 47 identification of the infringing material to be
removed or access disabled by the ISP and sufficient information
39 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (b)(1-2).
40
Dmiarieva, supra note 37, at 242.
41 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (c).

17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (c)(1) (West Group 2001).
§ 512 (c)(2).
44See
§ 512 (c)(3).
4
42

43 See

1 See
46 See

§ 512 (c)(3)(A).
§ 512 (c)(3)(A)(i).
47
See § 512 (c)(3)(A)(ii).
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for the ISP to locate that material; 48 contact information of the
complaining party;49 a statement that the complaining party has a
good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained
of is not authorized by the copyright owner; 50 and a statement by
the complaining party that the information in the notice is accurate
and that, under the penalty of perjury, the party is authorized to act
on behalf of the copyright owner of the allegedly infringed
exclusive right.5 ' Upon receiving notification that substantially
complies with the above requirements, the ISP must remove or
material in order to find
disable access to the allegedly infringing
52
harbor."
"safe
this
under
protection
E. InformationLocation Tools
Subsection (d) of OCILLA limits liability for ISPs who provide
information location tools such as hypertext links, directories or
indexes to infringing material on the ISP's system. 53 The ISP must
meet the following conditions in order to qualify for this "safe
harbor": the ISP must not have actual knowledge of the infringing
material; 54 must not be aware of circumstances from which the
infringing activity is apparent; 55 and must not directly benefit
financially from the infringing activity "in a case where the ISP
has the right and ability to control such activity." 56 When the ISP
receives notice of the alleged infringement, the ISP must remove
or block access to the allegedly infringing material.57
OCILLA does distinguish between direct infingement and

48 See § 512 (c)(3)(A)(iii).
49

See § 512 (c)(3)(A)(iv).
'oSee § 512 (c)(3)(A)(v).
sl See § 512 (c)(3)(A)(vi).
52
Delaney, supra note 38, at 140-141.
13 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (d) (West Group 2001).
54
See § 512 (d)(1)(A).
5
sSee § 512 (d)(1)(B).
56
See § 512 (d)(2).
57
See § 512 (d)(3).
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secondary infringement, 58 but "it does not define contributory or
vicarious infringement or limit the other defenses available to a
service provider." 59 The complaining party must still prove that
the ISP is liable under direct, vicarious, or contributory
provides ISPs with defenses against
infringement, but the DMCA
6
claims.
infringement
such
III. SUBJECT OPINION
On February 6, 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit decided ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities
Inc.,61 a case that may have a substantial impact on how copyright
law is applied to the Internet. 62 By reversing the summary
judgment ruling against ALS Scan, Inc. ("ALS Scan"), the court
denied an ISP protection under the "safe harbor" defense provided
by the DMCA and remanded the case to determine if ALS Scan's
infringement claims would
allegations of third party copyright
63
defendant.
the
against
prevail
A. The Parties
64
ALS Scan is a creator and marketer of "adult" photographs.
ALS Scan distributes these pictures on the Internet to paying
65
subscribers and sells the pictures on CD ROMs and videotapes. 66
ALS Scan is the copyright owner of all of these photographs.
Defendant RemarQ Communities, Inc. ("RemarQ") is an ISP

58

ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys. Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 622 (4th Cir. Feb. 6,

2001).
59
at 261.
60 Joseph, supranote 14,

Michelle A. Ravn, Navigating TerraIncognita: Why the DigitalMillennium
CopyrightAct Was Needed to Chartthe Course of Online Service Provider
Liabilityfor CopyrightInfringement, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 755, 788 (1999).
61ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 622.
62 Id.at 620.
63

Id.at 626.
64 Id. at 620.
65 id.

66

ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 620.
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67
allowing
its users
subscribers
access
to various
newsgroups,
are
to read. 68which
RemarQ
sites
where
can post
messages
for others

does not monitor, regulate, or censor the content of the articles
posted on any of the newsgroups by its subscribers, but it does
have the ability to filter information in the newsgroups and can
screen members from logging onto certain newsgroups.
B. History of the Case
Two of the newsgroups to which RemarQ provided access for its
subscribers contained ALS Scan's name in their titles, "alt.als" and
"alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.als,"
both of which contained
hundreds of postings by RemarQ's subscribers that infinged ALS
Scan's copyrights. 70 ALS Scan sent RemarQ a cease and desist
letter dated August 2, 1999 requesting RemarQ to cease carrying
the two newsgroups containing ALS Scan's name in the titles and
provided RemarQ with links to ALS Scan's websites that
contained ALS Scan's models and copyright information. 7 1 ALS
Scan claimed in the letter that both of those newsgroups were
created solely for the purpose of violating their federally filed
copyrights and tradename and that RemarQ's servers provided
access to these illegally posted images and enabled transmission of
these images across state lines. 72 RemarQ refused to comply with
ALS Scan's request unless ALS Scan identified the infringing
materials with "sufficient specificity" according the DMCA
requirements.73 ALS Scan responded that over 10,000 copyrighted
images were in the newsgroups, but did not identify which specific
images were infinging.74
ALS Scan then filed suit against RemarQ, alleging violations of
67

/d.
68 Delaney, supra note 52, at 125.
69ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 620.

70

71

id.
id.

72 Id.
73

ALSScan, 239 F.3d at 621.

74Ird"
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75
the Copyright Act, Title II of the DMCA, and unfair competition.
In response, RemarQ filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, or in
the alternative, a motion for summary judgment and also filed
affidavits stating that RemarQ would remove any infinging
articles posted on the newsgroups if these articles were specifically
identified.76 RemarQ's response included a "safe harbor" defense
under the DMCA alleging that ALS Scan did not meet the notice
requirements stated in the DMCA and therefore, because RemarQ
it is not liable for any infinging material posted by third
is an ISP,
77
parties.
The district court, treating RemarQ's motion to dismiss and its
motion for summary judgment as one, granted the motion to
dismiss stating that: (1) RemarQ could not be held liable for direct
copyright infringement simply because it provided access to
newsgroups that contained infringing material; and (2) RemarQ
could not be held liable for contributory infringement because
ALS Scan did not comply with the DMCA notice requirements.78
The district court's ruling followed the decision of Religious
Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services,
Inc.,79 which determined an ISP that serves as a passive conduit for
copyrighted material, meaning without human intervention, cannot
infringer. 80 ALS Scan appealed the
be held liable as a direct
81
ruling.
district court's

C. Court's Analysis and Decision
In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit found that the DMCA and not
the Netcom case, controls the decision in this case.8 2 The court
reasoned that although ALS Scan did not comply perfectly with
75

ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 621.

76 m.

77 id.
78 id.
79

Id. at 621-622 (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368-73 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
80
See ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 621.
81
82 Id. at 622.
Id. at 625.
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the DMCA's notification requirements because it did not provide a
list of the infringing works to RemarQ, that ALS Scan's83
"substantial" compliance was sufficient to put RemarQ on notice.
The Court held that a representative list of the allegedly infringing
materials provided by the complaining party was sufficient to meet
the notification requirements and substantially comply with the
DMCA.84 The Court stated that because ALS Scan's notice was
not defective, RemarQ could
not use the protection offered by the
"safe harbor" provisions. 85
IV. ANALYSIS

The DMCA was enacted to create a balance between the
protections of the exclusive rights of copyright owners and the
growth of the Internet. 86 Congress noted with specificity the
requirements a complaining party must substantially fulfill in order
to provide adequate notice to an ISP listing six elements that
should be included in the written notification. 87 One of those
elements is the identification of the material that is claimed to have
been infringed, or if there are multiple copyrighted works at a
single online site, then the complaining party should provide a
representative list of those works to the ISP.88 "Courts may not
consider notification that is not in substantial compliance when
ascertaining the service provider's awareness or knowledge of
infringing materials or activity."89
The ALS Scan Court noted that the DMCA requires the
complaining party to put the ISP on notice by "comport[ing] with
the prescribed format only 'substantially,' rather than perfectly" 90
and that according to the statute, only a representative list was
83

ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625.
8 Id.
851d.
86 Costar

Group Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 2001 WL 1153544 *7 (D.Md. 2001).
17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (c)(3) (West Group 2001).
" See id. § 512 (c)(3)(ii).
8
9 Halpern, supra note 17, at 400.
90
ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625.
87
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91
necessary with respect to allegedly infringed multiple works.
The Court denied RemarQ protection under the "safe harbors" of
OCILLA because the Court believed ALS Scan had
"substantially" complied with the notification requirement 92 found
in subsection (c) of the Act.93 The Court found that ALS Scan
complied with the identification requirement of multiple works
merely by providing a link to ALS Scan's websites where their
models could be identified 94 and the Court did not require that
an actual representative list of the allegedly
ALS Scan provide
95
works.
infinging
The ALS Scan Court seemed persuaded that the newsgroups
ALS Scan were complaining about included ALS Scan's name in
the title, which ALS Scan insisted were created solely for the
purpose of illegally posting ALS Scan's copyrighted
photographs. 96 However, the Court did note that not every image
in the two newsgroups were copyrighted photographs owned by
ALS Scan, but they stated that RemarQ had remedies 97 for any
injuries incurred as a result of removing noninfringing material. 98
ALS Scan's argument is persuasive that the two newsgroups were
created only for the purpose of posting their copyrighted images
and therefore, does not require them to provide the ISP with an
actual representative list.
However, in situations unlike ALS Scan where the alleged
infringing materials do not fully encompass the copyright owner's
materials, courts should find that the complaining party must
specifically enumerate the allegedly infringing materials or risk the
possibility of defective notification. In Hendrickson v. Ebay,
Inc.,99 the court found that the copyright owner gave deficient
notice to the defendant, an online auction site, regarding the
91
92

ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625.
id.

93
17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (c)(3) (West Group 2001).
94
ALSScan, 239 F.3d at 621.
9
' Id. at 625.
96

Id. at 621.

9' 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (f)(g) (West Group 2001).
98
99

ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625.
Hendrickson v. Ebay, Inc., 2001 WL 1078981 (C.D. Cal., 2001).
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allegedly infinging DVD copies of his movie, Manson. The court
noted that proper identification of the materials was required,
including the specific item numbers of the listings of allegedly
infringing materials, and plaintiffs failure to provide with
specificity allowed the defendant
to claim protection under the
"safe harbor" provisions. 100
Adequate notification is significant because the DMCA's "safe
harbor" protections disappear the moment the ISP has knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of the infringing material. 10 1
Although the actual notice itself does not remove the ISP's
protections, giving adequate notification of infringing materials
shifts the burden to the ISP to remove or disable the infringing
material. 10 2 If an ISP fails to remove or disable the infringing
10 3
material, they lose the protections offered by the DMCA.
However, if the notification is defective, then that defective notice
cannot be considered in determining if an ISP has actual
knowledge or is aware
of circumstances from which an infringing
104
activity is apparent.
Courts should be cautious when allowing complaining parties to
prevail when they do not necessarily comply with the notification
provisions of the DMCA. Congress used specificity when
describing the elements required in order to achieve adequate
notification. By loosening these requirements, courts must be
careful that they do not overlook Congress' intention. As a result
of the inconsistent standards implemented by courts as satisfying
the notification requirement, ISPs may end up being overly
cautious when deciding to remove allegedly infringing materials.
This goes against Congress' intention to allow the growth of the
Internet while protecting copyright owners' rights. As Senator
Orrin G. Hatch stated, "In addition to securing copyright in the
global, digital environment, the DMCA also clarifies the liability
'00 Hendrickson at *8.
'o1ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625.
102 Costar Group Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 2001 WL 1153544 *11 (D.Md., 2001)
(quoting ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (2001)).
'0 See 17 U.S.C.A. §512 (West Group 2001); See ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625.
104 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (c)(3)(B)(i) (West Group 2001).
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of on-line and Internet service providers - OSPs 10 5 and ISPs - for
copyright infringement liability. The OSPs and ISPs needed more
certainty in this area in order to attract the substantial investments
necessary 10 6to continue the expansion and upgrading of the
Internet."
V. CONCLUSION

Congress passed the DMCA to help clarify how copyright law
interacts with the Internet. Individuals and entities rely on the
DMCA to give guidance as to when they may be liable for
In drafting the DMCA, Congress
copyright infringement.
specifically noted the requirements copyright owners must meet to
put an ISP on notice of any infringing material posted by a third
party. The courts that have already interpreted the statute have
altered these requirements and parties continue to be unsure of
when the DMCA will protect them.
Proponents of the ALS Scan court's ruling may argue that there
are remedies for ISPs who are forced to take down material that is
later determined to not be infringing. However, forcing an ISP to
remove allegedly infringing material without meeting the
specificity requirements of the DMCA potentially leads to the
same dilemmas the DMCA was originally created to solve. The
balance between copyright protection and the growth of the
Internet continues to be imbalanced as the courts alter the
requirements set out by Congress in the DMCA.
LauraRybka

105 Goldstein, supra note 4, at 592 (Online service providers "provide content
through proprietary networks in addition to Internet access, which is provided
through the same networks").
106 144 CONG. REC. S 11,889 (1998), availableat http://thomas.loc.gov.
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